Returning to First Priniciples: International Human Rights as U.S. Constitutionalism by Saito, Natsu Taylor
FIU Law Review 
Volume 1 
Number 1 Inaugural Issue Article 8 
Spring 2006 
Returning to First Priniciples: International Human Rights as U.S. 
Constitutionalism 
Natsu Taylor Saito 
Georgia State University College of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ecollections.law.fiu.edu/lawreview 
 Part of the Other Law Commons 
Online ISSN: 2643-7759 
Recommended Citation 
Natsu T. Saito, Returning to First Priniciples: International Human Rights as U.S. Constitutionalism, 1 FIU 
L. Rev. 45 (2006). 
Available at: https://ecollections.law.fiu.edu/lawreview/vol1/iss1/8 
This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by eCollections. It has been accepted for inclusion in 
FIU Law Review by an authorized editor of eCollections. For more information, please contact lisdavis@fiu.edu. 
45
Returning to First Principles:                         
International Human Rights as U.S. Constitutionalism 
Natsu Taylor Saito†
America must stand firmly for the nonnegotiable demands of human 
dignity:  the rule of law; limits on the absolute power of the state; free 
speech; freedom of worship; equal justice; respect for women; reli-
gious and ethnic tolerance; and respect for private property. 
These demands can be met in many ways.  America’s constitution 
has served us well.  Many other nations, with different histories and 
cultures, facing different circumstances, have successfully incorpo-
rated these core principles into their own systems of governance. . . .  
[T]he national security strategy of the United States must start from 
these core beliefs and look outward for possibilities to expand liberty.
 The National Security Strategy of the United States 1
The Constitution of the United States has long been upheld as an ideal 
foundation for a society concerned with preserving democracy and funda-
mental human rights.  In those respects it has had, of course, a checkered 
history—initially protecting the institution of chattel slavery,2 for example, 
and being interpreted to allow de jure apartheid for the better part of a cen-
tury after slavery was abolished and equal protection mandated.3  Nonethe-
† Professor of Law, Georgia State University College of Law.  I am grateful to Ward Churchill 
and Andrea Curcio for their comments and suggestions, and to all the lawyers who have been working to 
ensure the enforcement of international law. 
1
 The National Security Strategy of the United States, Policy Report prepared by the Bush Ad-
ministration and released to Congress on September 19, 2002 pursuant to §108 of the National Security 
Act of 1947, 50 U.S.C. 404a (1999) [hereinafter National Security Report] available at 
www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf. 
2 See PAUL FINKELMAN, SLAVERY AND THE FOUNDERS: RACE AND LIBERTY IN THE AGE OF 
JEFFERSON 1-33 (1996); Staughton Lynd, Slavery and the Founding Fathers, in BLACK HISTORY: A
REAPPRAISAL 115 (Melvin Drimmer ed., 1968); see generally Richard B. Lillich, The United States 
Constitution and International Human Rights Law, 3 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 53 (1990) (discussing early 
limitations to constitutional protections). 
3
 See U.S. CONST. amends. XIII (1866) (abolishing slavery except as punishment upon convic-
tion of a crime) and XIV (1868) (mandating equal protection under law); Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 
537 (1896) (holding legally mandated segregation of public accommodations to be constitutionally 
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less, its basic provisions provide a framework which explicitly protects 
human rights and, by virtue of its acknowledgment of international law, 
allows for these protections to evolve. 
Has the Supreme Court, and the judiciary more generally, consistently 
interpreted the Constitution in a way which furthers human rights?  Clearly 
not.  While there have been some landmark cases interpreting constitutional 
rights broadly and acknowledging the judiciary’s responsibility to enforce 
international law,4  there have been many more in which the Court has 
failed to enforce internationally recognized rights, most often by deferring 
to the “political” branches of government.5
The actions of the executive branch have a similarly checkered history.   
We have seen a consistent articulation of the “core principles” at issue, and 
frequent interventions in international fora to define basic rights, create 
international institutions and, on occasion, enforce these rights.  Thus, the 
United States was a moving force in the formation of the League of Na-
tions, the Nuremberg Tribunals and the United Nations; it played a decisive 
role in the drafting of the UN Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, all of the major human rights treaties promulgated since World War 
II, and even the Rome Treaty establishing the International Criminal Court.  
Yet it never joined the League of Nations; withdrew from the compulsory 
jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”), has never become 
a party to most human rights treaties; insists on numerous reservations to 
those it does ratify; and refuses to participate in the International Criminal 
Court (“ICC”).6  The most frequently invoked explanation for these failures 
is that committing itself to such treaties or institutions would infringe on 
U.S. sovereignty or violate the Constitution.7
Under these circumstances can we say that United States constitution-
alism is good or bad for international human rights?  Is it simply a mixed 
bag—some good, some bad?  Do the myriad instances of U.S. violation of 
acceptable); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (finally overturning Plessy in the context of 
public education). See generally A. LEON HIGGINBOTHAM, JR., SHADES OF FREEDOM: RACIAL POLITICS 
AND PRESUMPTIONS OF THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROCESS (1996).
4
 See infra notes 111-116 and accompanying text. 
5
 See infra notes 71-90 and accompanying text. 
6
 See generally Amy C. Harfeld, Oh Righteous Delinquent One: The United States’ International 
Human Rights Double Standard – Explanation, Example, and Avenues for Change, 4 N.Y. CITY L. REV.
59 (2001); on the ICC, see generally Diane F. Orentlicher, Unilateral Multilateralism: United States 
Policy Toward the International Criminal Court, 36 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 415 (2004). 
7
 See, e.g., Kristafer Ailsliger, Why The United States Should be Wary of the International Crimi-
nal Court: Concerns Over Sovereignty and Constitutional Guarantees, 39 WASHBURN L.J. 80 (1999) 
(making such arguments); see also John R. Worth, Globalization and the Myth of Absolute National 
Sovereignty: Reconsidering the “Un-Signing” of the Rome Statute and the Legacy of Senator Bricker,
79 IND. L.J. 245 (2004) (comparing such positions to arguments made in the 1950s by those fearing that 
international treaties would require racial desegregation in the U.S.). 
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international law8 cancel out any good that may have been done?  Or has 
the United States, working within the constitutional framework, promoted 
human rights as best it could, deviating from international standards only 
when  protecting even more  important rights?  One of the problems of thus 
framing the question is that it presumes the U.S. Constitution and legal sys-
tem to be distinct and separable from international human rights law.  They 
clearly have been interpreted as such by the Supreme Court and by officials 
of the U.S. government and, thus construed, have often been in conflict.  
But the Constitution can be—and has been—interpreted in a much different 
manner, one in which its relationship to international law is understood as 
organic and interdependent.  Viewed in this light, a different question 
arises:  is international human rights law good or bad for U.S. constitution-
alism?   
In this essay I sketch out some basic arguments for interpreting the 
Constitution as both inclusive of and dependent upon international law.   
From this perspective, the Constitution and the emerging international hu-
man rights regime are complementary, mutually reinforcing and integrally 
related systems.  While this is admittedly a framing which flies in the face 
of much judicial opinion, the ability to envision and invoke change is, one 
hopes, the strength of democracy.  There was, after all—to return to our 
initial example—plenty of judicial precedent holding slavery and racial 
discrimination to be constitutional before the Civil War amendments were 
enacted and the Supreme Court began to enforce equal protection under 
law,9 precedent which in many ways parallels the Supreme Court’s more 
recent refusals to enforce human rights law.  If we are willing to return to 
first principles, I believe we will see that international human rights law can 
contribute a great deal to U.S. constitutionalism. 
I. CONSTRUCTION OF A FALSE DICHOTOMY
We will take the actions necessary to ensure that our efforts to meet 
our global security commitments and protect Americans are not im-
paired by the potential for investigations, inquiry, or prosecutions by 
the International Criminal Court (ICC), whose jurisdiction does not 
extend to Americans and which we do not accept.
The National Security Strategy of the United States 10
8
 For a chronology summarizing such violations since World War II, see WARD CHURCHILL, ON
THE JUSTICE OF ROOSTING CHICKENS: REFLECTIONS ON THE CONSEQUENCES OF U.S. IMPERIAL 
ARROGANCE AND CRIMINALITY 97-301 (2003); on some of the most recent violations, see generally 
Jordan J. Paust, Executive Plans and Authorizations to Violate International Law, 43 COL. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 811 (2005).  
9
 See, e.g., Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 407 (1856) (holding that persons of 
African descent were not citizens of the United States, nor even “persons” under the law). 
10
 National Security Report, supra note 1. 
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Senator Claiborne Pell: “Would it not be a matter of customary law 
that [the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties] should be fol-
lowed?”
Senator Jesse Helms: “Not at all.  Not at all.  If you do not ratify a 
treaty, it is like a dead cat lying on somebody’s doorstep.”
Congressional Record, May 18, 1988 11
A. Domestic and International Law:  Necessarily Distinct?
It is part of our canon that, although some states explicitly incorporate 
international law into domestic law at a constitutional level, the United 
States takes a “dualist” approach in which domestic and international law 
run on separate, if somewhat parallel, tracks.12     
This framing, which reflects prevailing judicial doctrine, provides the 
foundation for the usual arguments employed to justify the United States’ 
failure to comply with international law when it is perceived that doing so 
would conflict with its “national interests.” Working from the presumption 
that international and U.S. constitutional law will at times diverge, the first 
argument is that, in such cases, enforcing international law would infringe 
on U.S. sovereignty.  The second, which forms a sort of “back up” reassur-
ance to the citizenry, is that we do not need the protections of international 
human rights law because the Constitution provides better protection.  A 
corollary of this second argument is that if other states would adopt some-
thing closer to our constitutional system, their peoples would be better off, 
too.
This approach is reflected in the excerpt from the National Security 
Strategy of the United States of America (“NSS”), quoted at the beginning 
of this essay.  Reflecting the views of the White House as reported to Con-
gress in September 2002, the NSS first acknowledges the fundamental im-
portance of human rights and, in a distinctly self-congratulatory manner, 
notes that the Constitution “has served us well” in ensuring these rights.  It 
appears to endorse a pluralist approach, saying “[t]hese demands can be met 
in many ways,” but if there are many ways to get there, there is only one 
place to go.  As George W. Bush asserts in his introduction to the NSS, 
“The great struggles of the twentieth century between liberty and totalitari-
anism ended with a decisive victory for the forces of freedom – and a single 
11
 134 Cong. Rec. S6052-01, 1988 WL 1090139 (May 18, 1988). 
12
 See Louis Henkin, The Constitution and United States Sovereignty: A Century of Chinese 
Exclusion and Its Progeny, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 853, 864-66 (1987) (discussing monism and dualism); 
HENRY J. STEINER & PHILIP ALSTON, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT: LAW, POLITICS,
MORALS 987-1081 (2d ed. 2000) (overview of options for interpenetration of international and national 
systems). 
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sustainable model for national success: freedom, democracy, and free en-
terprise.”   
The NSS goes on to make it clear that, in fulfilling its “responsibility 
to history” to “rid the world of evil,” the U.S. will assert a prerogative to 
override international consensus should it so choose.  It begins with the 
candid acknowledgment that “[t]he United States possesses unprece-
dented—and unequaled—strength and influence in the world,” and goes on 
to explain that this power will be exercised unilaterally:  “The U.S. national 
security strategy will be based on a distinctly American internationalism 
that reflects the union of our values and our national interests.”13
Whether one’s priority is the assurance of human rights at home or 
globally, the physical well-being of the American people, or adherence to 
Constitutional principles, this stance of American exceptionalism is prob-
lematic.  First, it is a politically hypocritical position in light of the United 
States’ stated commitment to the global rule of law, its frequent insistence 
that other countries adhere to internationally recognized human rights 
norms as well as international law more generally, and its history of influ-
encing the articulation of human rights law and shaping the global and re-
gional institutions which enforce it.  This results in frustration and resent-
ment around the world, and reinforces the belief that because the United 
States will not submit to the jurisdiction of international bodies, its influ-
ence can only be countered by means outside of such structures, one such 
means, of course, being terrorism.  In addition to the realpolitik concerns 
raised by a U.S. approach which is perceived at best as paternalistic and 
more often as explicitly imperialist, I believe it is, in more theoretical terms, 
based on a false dichotomy, for compliance with international law neither 
infringes on U.S. sovereignty nor requires any deviation from the Constitu-
tion.
B. Misconstruing Sovereignty       
The argument that state sovereignty can override international law is, I 
believe, exactly backwards.  Returning to first principles, the United States 
has a claim to sovereignty because of its existence as a state which, in turn, 
is defined as “an entity that has a defined territory and a permanent popula-
tion, under the control of its own government, and that engages in, or has 
the capacity to engage in, formal relations with other such entities.”14
The frequently used term “nation-state” misleadingly conflates states, 
as defined in international law and recognized by the United States, with 
nations.  “A nation is a cultural territory made up of communities of indi-
viduals who see themselves as ‘one people’ on the basis of common ances-
13
 National Security Report, supra note 1 (no page numbers) (emphasis added). 
14
 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (1987) §201.  
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try, history, society, institutions, ideology, language, territory, and, often, 
religion.”15  It is estimated that between 5,000 and 8,000 nations, so de-
fined, exist within the territorial boundaries of the approximately 200 cur-
rently recognized states of the world.16  Nations may have historical, geo-
graphic, cultural or ethnological claims to self-determination which, while 
acknowledged in international law, go deeper than any legal system.   
States, on the other hand, are explicitly political entities, encompassing 
peoples and lands acquired by force or diplomacy.  As a result, their claims 
to legitimacy and to sovereignty over territory and peoples rest on an inter-
state system of  mutual political acceptance; the concept of sovereignty as 
currently employed is rooted in the agreement of states to respect each oth-
ers’ territorial boundaries and internal systems of governance.17  As Alexan-
der Aleinikoff notes, “‘external’ sovereignty, based as it is on a norm of 
noninterference, depends upon the existence and well functioning of an 
international regime of states with the power to recognize those entities 
whose sovereignty must be respected and to maintain order within the re-
gime.”18  States and their sovereignty are thus derivative of international 
law which, in turn, continues to be created by states.  Because the interna-
tional organizations which articulate, develop and enforce that law are 
comprised of states, the legal system which results explicitly protects state 
sovereignty and allows for measures necessary to preserve a state’s “na-
tional security.”19  In other words, sovereignty is not a trump card which can 
be used to override or violate international law at will; the only legitimate 
objections that can be raised go to whether the actions of another state or an 
international organization violate mutually agreed-upon rules.  
15
 Bernard Nietschmann, The Fourth World: Nations Versus States, in REORDERING THE WORLD:
GEOPOLITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE 21ST CENTURY 225-26 (George J. Demko & William B. Wood, 
eds., 1st ed. 1994). 
16
 Id. at 225.  The United Nations currently lists 191 member states.  See
http://www.un.org/Overview/unmember.html. 
17
 Originally “sovereignty” referred to the relationship between the ruler and his/her subjects, 
usually framed in religious terms.  See Louis Henkin, That “S” Word: Sovereignty, and Globalization, 
and Human Rights, Et Cetera, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 1-2 (1999).  In a world structured—still—within 
a predominantly Westphalian framework, I believe that we have the choice of moving toward an Hege-
lian conception of the state as all-powerful, a position articulated by Carl Schmidt, preeminent legal 
theorist of the Third Reich, or an understanding of the state as an explicitly political construct dependent 
on the mutual recognition of other states.  See CARL SCHMIDT, POLITICAL THEOLOGY: FOUR CHAPTERS 
ON THE CONCEPT OF SOVEREIGNTY (George Schwab trans., 1988).  For a discussion of various ways in 
which the term is used and the inadequacies of a Westphalian model, see generally STEPHEN D.
KRASNER, SOVEREIGNTY: ORGANIZED HYPOCRISY (1999). 
18
 T. Alexander Aleinikoff, International Law, Sovereignty, and American Constitutionalism: 
Reflections on the Customary International Law Debate, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 91, 104 n.84 (2004).  
19
 Thus, for example, art. 4 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 16 Dec. 
1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, provides procedures for derogation from certain, but not all, of its provisions in 
“time of public emergency which threatens the life of the nation and the existence of which is officially 
proclaimed.”   
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C. Divorcing International Law from the Constitution   
As a state recognized by the international community, the United 
States has certain fundamental rights and responsibilities under interna-
tional law which are recognized by and incorporated into its Constitution.  
When the United States declared its independence from Britain it was at 
best a “rogue” state, for the European colonial powers who comprised the 
“civilized world” and were, therefore, the arbiters of its law, were hardly 
inclined to encourage colonial rebellions.20  As a practical matter, therefore, 
the newly formed United States desperately needed to be recognized as a 
legitimate state and, to this end, the founders explicitly articulated the su-
premacy of treaties in the Constitution, thereby assuring both the European 
powers and its American Indian neighbors that it was committed to the rule 
of law.21  It was presumed that the country was bound by, and would com-
ply with, the underlying foundation of the “law of nations,” customary in-
ternational law.22
In 1793 Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson assured the French Minis-
ter that the law of nations was an “integral part” of U.S. law, and Supreme 
Court Chief Justice Jay affirmed that the “laws of the United States,” as 
referenced in Articles III and VI of the Constitution, included customary 
international law.23  This was repeatedly articulated by governmental repre-
sentatives and in judicial opinions and, thus, when Justice Gray made his 
oft-quoted statement in the 1900 Paquete Habana case that “[i]nternational 
law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and administered by the 
court of justice of appropriate jurisdiction, as often as questions of right 
depending upon it are duly presented for their determination,”24 he was 
summarizing well over a century of U.S. jurisprudence.   
That the Supreme Court has often failed to enforce international law, 
choosing instead to “defer” to Congress and the Executive, can thus be seen 
not as legitimate “constitutionalism” but the abdication of its most funda-
mental responsibility under Article III.  If, as the founders so consistently 
and unequivocally stated, international law is United States law, the Consti-
tution mandates its enforcement not only in Article VI, where treaties are 
20
 See Ward Churchill, The Law Stood Squarely on Its Head: U.S. Legal Doctrine, Indigenous 
Self-Determination and the Question of World Order, 81 ORE. L. REV. 663, 671 (2002). 
21
 See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (declaring treaties to be “the supreme Law of the Land”); Sieg-
fried Wiessner, American Indian Treaties and Modern International Law, 7 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 567, 
591 (1995).  See generally Vine Deloria, Jr., Self-Determination and the Concept of Sovereignty, in
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN AMERICAN INDIAN RESERVATIONS 22-28 (Roxanne Dunbar Ortiz & Larry 
Emerson eds., 1979). 
22
 See JORDAN J. PAUST, INTERNATIONAL LAW AS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 3-66 (2d ed. 2003).    
23
 See id., at 7-8 (citing Jefferson, Letter as Secretary of State to French Minister Genet (June 5, 
1793)); Henfield’s Case, 11 F. Cas. 1099, 1101 (C.C.D. Pa. 1793); for numerous similar examples, see 
PAUST, INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 22, at 7-11.    
24
 The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900).   
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specifically mentioned as part of the “supreme Law of the Land,” but also 
in Article III’s reference to “Laws of the United States.”  Nowhere does it 
say—or imply—that the balance of power so carefully created among the 
executive, legislative and judicial branches could or should be tipped by 
judicial inventions such as the “political question” or “act of state” doc-
trines, the “last in time” rule, the refusal to enforce treaties because they are 
deemed “non-self-executing,”25 or a blind deference to a “plenary power” of 
government.26
Similarly, the argument that compliance with international law would, 
in certain cases, violate the constitutionally mandated balance of federal 
and (domestic) states’ rights is without foundation.  The states of the Union 
have certain rights vis-a-vis the federal government;27 they have no right to 
violate international law.  Because the founders were so clear on the impor-
tance of U.S. compliance with international law, and could not afford to 
have the legitimacy of the country undermined by an inability to control 
state actions in the international realm, they specifically reserved the for-
eign affairs powers to the federal government.28  As Chief Justice Jay stated 
in 1793 in Chisholm v. Georgia, even before the Constitution was adopted, 
“the United States had . . . become amenable to the laws of nations; and it 
was their interests as well as their duty to provide, that those laws should be 
respected and obeyed; in their national character and capacity, the United 
States were responsible to foreign nations for the conduct of each state, 
relative to the laws of nations, and the performance of treaties . . . .”29
With respect to international human rights law, not only do all of the 
above arguments apply, but we also have the specific protections articulated 
in the Bill of Rights and the blanket guarantee of Article IX, which states 
that “[t]he enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be 
construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.”30  As Jordan 
Paust explains, “[i]ts utility lies not in asking how internationally recog-
nized rights can be ‘implemented’ into our domestic law through new legis-
lative acts, but in recognizing that basic human rights are already a viable 
25
 See PAUST, INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 22, at 67-98 (non-self-executing treaties); 100-02 
(last in time rule); 169-179 (political question and executive enforcement of treaties); 231, 305-08 (act 
of state doctrine).  
26
 For overviews of the plenary power doctrine, see generally T. ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF,
SEMBLANCES OF SOVEREIGNTY: THE CONSTITUTION, THE STATE, AND AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP (2002);  
Natsu Taylor Saito, Asserting Plenary Power Over the “Other”: Indians, Immigrants, Colonial Sub-
jects, and Why U.S. Jurisprudence Needs to Incorporate International Law, 20 YALE L. & POL. REV. 427 
(2002).  
27
 See U.S. CONST. amend. X (1791) (powers not delegated to the federal government, nor prohib-
ited to the states, “are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people”). 
28
 See Henkin, Chinese Exclusion, supra note 12, at 866-67. 
29
 Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 474 (1793), quoted in PAUST, INTERNATIONAL LAW,
supra note 22 at 8. 
30
 U.S. Constitution, amend. IX (1791). 
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part of the constitutionally guaranteed rights of Americans.”31  To confuse 
these retained rights with delegated powers, he continues, “opens the door 
to a false, totalitarian, and subversive concept of authority—i.e., that au-
thority exists with the government and not with the people.”32
D. Misrepresenting the Constitution as Conflicting with Human Rights 
Despite the explicit statements and historical context indicating that in-
ternational law was to be fully incorporated into the Constitution and, 
thereby, into domestic law, the Constitution is often invoked as the “expla-
nation” for why the United States does not, cannot, or need not participate 
in international human rights treaties or their enforcement mechanisms.33
Sometimes this comes in the form of a straightforward rejection of the in-
ternational legal system as “interfering” with the prerogatives presumed to 
be inherent to state sovereignty, a position discussed above.  A variant of 
this is the argument that the United States can only function within the 
bounds of its Constitution, is therefore only committed to human rights as 
explicitly articulated in the Bill of Rights, and, as a result, is limited in its 
enforcement of those rights to the Supreme Court’s current interpretation of 
their reach.   
The first premise of this argument could be challenged, for it is a fun-
damental tenet of international law that a state cannot invoke its domestic 
law to justify violations of international law.  Not only is this specifically 
articulated in the Vienna Convention on Treaties,34 which, contrary to Sena-
tor Helms’ assertion, has been acknowledged generally as reflecting binding 
customary law,35 but it was a major premise underlying the U.S.’ position at 
the Nuremberg Tribunal.36  But it is unnecessary to engage in this debate, 
for there is nothing in the Constitution which precludes the enforcement of 
31
 PAUST, INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 22, at 324; see also id. at 323-359. 
32
 Id. at 328. 
33
 See David Golove, Human Rights Treaties and the U.S. Constitution, 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 579, 
583-88 (2002) (describing “constitutional” objections to human rights treaties); Peter J. Spiro, Treaties, 
International Law, and Constitutional Rights, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1999, 2002-17 (2003) (discussing the 
doctrine of “constitutional hegemony”). 
34
 Art. 27, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.39/27 at 289 (1969), 
1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980) (“A party may not invoke the provisions of its 
internal law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty.”). 
35
 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (1987) § 
325, cmt. a (noting that the Vienna Convention “represents generally accepted principles and the United 
States has also appeared willing to accept them despite differences of nuance and emphasis”); SIR IAN 
SINCLAIR, THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES 5-10 (2d ed. 1984). 
36
 See Matthew Lippman, The Other Nuremberg: American Prosecutions of Nazi War Criminals 
in Occupied Germany, 3 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 1, 62-75 (1992) (on the trial of Nazi prosecutors, 
judges and Justice Ministry officials); see generally Henry T. King, Jr., The Legacy of Nuremberg, 34 
CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 335 (2002); FROM NUREMBERG TO MY LAI, esp. 3-136 (Jay W. Baird ed., 
1972).   
31
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international law.  To the contrary, one can make a very solid argument that 
it mandates such enforcement.37  As the Ninth Amendment states explicitly, 
the protections enumerated in the first eight amendments are not the outer 
limits, as it were, of human rights protection, but simply a subset of guaran-
teed rights.  Combined with the Constitution’s incorporation of international 
law generally, the “rights retained by the people” surely include all funda-
mental human rights.  The Supreme Court could—and, I would argue, 
should—interpret the Bill of Rights in a manner congruent with the broader 
human rights regime.  But to the extent it fails to do so, there is nothing in 
the Constitution which precludes Congress or the Executive from recogniz-
ing broader rights.  
A more sophisticated version of this argument involves the assertion 
that the Constitution protects rights not yet recognized by the human rights 
regime, which would be infringed upon by compliance with certain interna-
tional norms.  Thus, for example, it is argued that prohibiting “hate speech” 
as required by the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms 
of Racial Discrimination (“ICERD”)38 would infringe on First Amendment 
freedom of speech.  Yet First Amendment jurisprudence illustrates that 
speech has been restricted in many circumstances, such as the advocacy of 
imminent violence, and there is currently an intra-constitutional debate 
about the extent to which enforcement of Fourteenth Amendment equal 
protection requires a similar limitation of speech designed to incite racial 
hatred or violence.39
Such arguments must be countered on a case-by-case basis requiring a 
detailed analysis beyond the scope of this essay.  However, there are very 
few cases in which such a conflict actually arises40 and, given the long his-
tory of working out a balance between rights when they come into conflict 
in domestic jurisprudence, there is no reason to believe a similar process 
cannot be fruitfully employed when the mandates of the Constitution and 
human rights law appear to be at odds.  At most, it would require some very 
37
 See Thomas Buergenthal, Modern Constitutions and Human Rights Treaties, 36 COL. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 211, 212 (1997) (“contemporary U.S. practice with regard to [human rights] treaties is 
neither constitutionally necessary nor compatible with the long-term interest of the United States”). 
38
 Mar. 7, 1966 (entered into force Jan. 4, 1969), G.A. Res. 2106, 600 U.N.T.S. 195. ICERD, 600 
U.N.T.S. 195.  The parties agree, under Art. 4, to criminalize the dissemination of ideas based on racial 
superiority or hatred, ban organizations that promote and incite racial discrimination, and prohibit public 
authorities and institutions from promoting or inciting racial discrimination. 
39
 See generally Alexander Tsesis, Regulating Intimidating Speech, 41 HARV. J. ON LEGISL. 389 
(2004); RICHARD DELGADO AND JEAN STEFANCIC, MUST WE DEFEND NAZIS? HATE SPEECH,
PORNOGRAPHY, AND THE NEW FIRST AMENDMENT (1997); John A. Powell, Worlds Apart: Reconciling 
Freedom of  Speech and Equality, 85 KY. L.J. 9 (1997); MARI J. MATSUDA, WORDS THAT WOUND:
CRITICAL RACE THEORY, ASSAULTIVE SPEECH, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1993).  
40
 See generally Johan D. van der Vyver, American Exceptionalism: Human Rights, International 
Criminal Justice, and National Self-Righteousness, 50 EMORY L.J. 775 (2001) (dispelling many of the 
claimed conflicts with both human rights treaties and the Rome Treaty establishing the ICC). 
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limited reservations to the ratification of some treaties, not a blanket refusal 
to go beyond existing constitutional jurisprudence.  There is, to reiterate, 
nothing inherent to U.S. constitutionalism that needs to constrict the human 
rights regime.41
II. IS THE CONSTITUTION A VIABLE ALTERNATIVE?
One of the great paradoxes of the progress of human rights thinking 
is that many prominent governments . . . basically believe that human 
rights are only relevant for other countries.  Human rights are treated 
as above all an instrument of foreign policy . . . . 
One of the most harmful features of Western-style global dominance 
is the perpetual rediscovery of its own perceived innocence . . . . [The 
United States] retains its sense of self as the last best hope of human-
ity, as the “city on the hill” . . . . 
This self-righteous diplomacy is producing a new crusader mentality 
that underpins the advocacy of humanitarian intervention, the geo-
graphic axis of which runs always North to South, with no contempla-
tion that perhaps there are circumstances of abuse that might validate 
South-to-North forms of intervention.
Richard Falk, Human Rights Horizons 42
As reflected in this excerpt, there is a belief, frequently expressed by 
those who still consider themselves to represent the “civilized world,” that 
human rights law addresses other people’s problems.43   When this attitude 
manifests as American exceptionalism it is the basis for widespread accusa-
41
 For a different approach with similar results, see generally Francisco Forrest Martin, Our 
Constitution as Federal Treaty: A New Theory of United States Constitutional Construction Based on An 
Originalist Understanding for Addressing a New World, 31 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 269 (2004) (advo-
cating interpretation of the Constitution as a treaty).
42
 RICHARD A. FALK, HUMAN RIGHTS HORIZONS: THE PURSUIT OF JUSTICE IN A GLOBALIZING 
WORLD 57, 87, 90 (2000). 
43
 See generally Makau Mutua, Savages, Victims, and Saviors: The Metaphor of Human Rights,
42 HARV. INT’L L.J. 201 (2001).  When the United States has been accused of violating fundamental 
human rights or failing to comply with the laws of war with respect to those deemed “Other” we often 
hear the rationalization that, because the Other is “uncivilized,” the U.S. need not comport with other-
wise applicable law.  See generally RICHARD DRINNON, FACING WEST: THE METAPHYSICS OF INDIAN-
HATING AND EMPIRE-BUILDING (1990) (illustrating this phenomenon with respect to American Indians 
and the war in Vietnam); STUART CREIGHTON MILLER, “BENEVOLENT ASSIMILATION”: THE AMERICAN 
CONQUEST OF THE PHILIPPINES, 1899-1903 (1982) (discussing the treatment of Filipinos).  In the context 
of the current war in Iraq, see Michael J. Frank, Justice for Iraq, Justice for All, 57 OKLA. L. REV. 303, 
305 n.18 (2004) (citing statements by Ann Coulter and Alan Dershowitz).  
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tions of U.S. hypocrisy.44  A somewhat more subtle variation of this ap-
proach is found in the assertion that the United States need not consider 
international human rights law to be binding upon itself because the Consti-
tution already guarantees the protections addressed in human rights law 
and, in fact, offers better protection.  It is those deemed “Other” who need 
human rights protection and, therefore, it is a legitimate issue of foreign but 
not domestic policy.   
One layer of this argument is, at its core, that our constitutional regime 
provides better, or at least sufficient, safeguards for all those under U.S. 
jurisdiction.  When specific examples of the U.S. failure to provide such 
protection are raised, we often see a retreat to the position that, even if there 
are others whom the system has on occasion failed, we (i.e., the citizenry, or 
some subset thereof45) do not need to be concerned because we are pro-
tected.  The subtext of this message is that citizens, those to whom the gov-
ernment should be most responsive, should not attempt to invoke the de-
mocratic processes of governmental or judicial accountability because, 
somehow, it is not our problem.   
There are two basic problems with this line of reasoning.  The first is 
the myriad of instances in which the Constitution has been interpreted to 
provide protections that fall short of the requirements of international hu-
man rights law, both with respect to citizens and noncitizens.  The second is 
that the courts have failed to impose otherwise applicable constitutional 
limits to executive and legislative action in a number of areas, on some 
variant of the theory that the Executive branch, alone or in concert with 
Congress, has plenary—i.e., full and absolute—power to which the courts 
will defer.  This plenary authority is exercised over both citizens and non-
citizens, with the result that the class of “fully protected” citizens is much 
narrower than generally presumed.  
A. Human Rights Law as Currently Implemented  
Responding first to the argument that the U.S. Constitution provides 
“better” protection of basic human rights than prevailing international law, 
a brief comparison is in order.  The United States has yet to become a party 
to a number of major human rights treaties, most notably the Convention on 
44
 See generally JULIE A. MERTUS, BAIT AND SWITCH: HUMAN RIGHTS AND U.S. FOREIGN 
POLICY (2004) (arguing that human rights rhetoric is used by the U.S. to entice compliance by other 
countries, then used to promote its interests); van der Vyver, supra note 40. 
45
 In the context of the “war on terror,” see generally Natsu Taylor Saito, For “Our” Security: 
Who is an “American” and What is Protected by Enhanced Law Enforcement and Intelligence Powers?,
2 SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST. 23 (2003); Thomas W. Joo, Presumed Disloyal: Executive Power, Judicial 
Deference, and the Construction of Race Before and After September 11, 34 COL. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 1 
(2002).  On the racialized construction of identity and citizenship, see generally Tayyab Mahmud, 
Colonialism and Modern Constructions of Race: A Preliminary Inquiry, 53 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1219 
(1999); IAN F. HANEY LOPEZ, WHITE BY LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE (1996).  
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the Rights of the Child,46 the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women,47 and the International Covenant on Eco-
nomic, Social and Cultural Rights.48  The treaties to which it is a party, in-
cluding the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide,49 the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,50 the 
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment,51 and the Convention on Racial Discrimination52
have all been ratified with an extensive package of reservations, under-
standings and declarations which, among other things, attempt to limit U.S. 
compliance to the obligations it has already acknowledged under the U.S. 
Constitution.53  While portrayed as an attempt to avoid conflict with the 
Constitution, in fact these amount to a statement that “adherence to an in-
ternational human rights treaty should not effect—or promise—change in 
existing U.S. law or practice.”54
If it were the case that the Constitution provides equivalent or better 
protection of the rights delineated in these treaties, such caveats would, 
presumably, be unnecessary.  In fact, however, the Constitution has not 
been interpreted to provide equivalent rights. The most glaring example of 
this is the United States’ insistence on retaining the death penalty in the face 
of a powerful international movement for its abolition,55 and particularly its 
46
 Nov. 20, 1989, G.A. Res. 25 ,U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 167, U.N. Doc. A/44/49 
(1989). 
47
 G.A. Res. 34/180, U.N. GAOR, 34th Sess., Supp. No. 46 at 194, U.N. Doc. A/34/830 (1979) 
(entered into force Sept. 3, 1981).  Over ninety percent of UN member states were parties by 2004.  See 
Marjorie Cohn, Resisting Equality: Why the U.S. Refuses to Ratify the Women’s Convention, 27 T. JEF-
FERSON L. REV. 15, 16, 22-23 (2004). 
48
 G.A. Res. 2200, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16 at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1967) (entered 
into force Jan. 3, 1976) 
49
 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, 78 
U.N.T.S. 277 (entered into force Jan. 12, 1951).   
50
 G.A. Res. 2200, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16 at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1967) (entered 
into force Mar. 23, 1976).  
51
 G.A. Res. 39/46, U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess., Supp. No. 51 at 197, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1984/72, 
(1984) (entered into force June 26, 1987). 
52
 Supra note 38. 
53
 See Louis Henkin, U.S. Ratification of Human Rights Conventions: The Ghost of Senator 
Bricker, 89 AM. J. INT’L L. 341, 341-48 (1995). 
54
 Id. at 341. 
55
 As of 2004, 117 states had abolished the death penalty in law or in practice; the majority of 
executions now take place in the U.S., China, Vietnam and Iran.  See John Paul Truskett, The Death 
Penalty, International Law, and Human Rights, 11 TULSA J. COMP. & INT’L L. 557, 558-59 (2004); see 
generally Stephen B. Bright, Will the Death Penalty Remain Alive in the Twenty-First Century?: Inter-
national Norms, Discrimination, Arbitrariness, and the Risk of Executing the Innocent, 2001 WIS. L.
REV. 1 (2001) (noting the disparity of U.S. practice from international norms, as well as resultant injus-
tices). The U.S. has not ratified the Second Optional Protocol to the ICCPR, intended to abolish capital 
punishment altogether, Dec. 15, 1989, G.A. Res. 44/128, UN GAOR 44th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 207,  
1642 U.N.T.S. 414.  
33
58 FIU Law Review [1:45
consistent reservation of the “right” to execute juveniles,56 a practice which 
was not abolished under domestic law until 2005.57  This, along with its 
practice of allowing youth under the age of eighteen to serve in the military, 
has been a primary reason the U.S. stands still alone—with Somalia—in 
refusing to become a party to the Convention on the Rights of the Child.58
The United States has also been criticized for its failure to comport 
with international human rights norms because of its rate of incarceration—
with only five percent of the world’s population, the U.S. holds twenty-five 
percent of its prisoners,59 the racially disparate implementation of its crimi-
nal laws,60 and conditions of incarceration which are cruel, inhuman or de-
grading.61  As Johan van der Vyver notes, “The internal American legal sys-
tem has fallen far behind international standards of criminal justice: any 
legal system that leaves scope for a child to be sent to prison for life with-
out the option of parole for a crime committed while the child was twelve 
years of age is in dire need of drastic reform.”62  The International Court of 
Justice recently found the U.S. in violation of a treaty requiring consular 
notification when foreign nationals are arrested,63 and the U.S.’s treatment 
of those seeking political asylum is widely considered to violate refugee 
law.64
56
 Art. 6(5) of the ICCPR specifically prohibits its imposition for crimes committed by those 
younger than eighteen.  While the U.S. claims that its reservations allow it to continue the practice, 
recent opinions of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights have stated that this is now a 
binding jus cogens norm.  See Stéphane Bourgon and Muriel Cauvin, Judgments and Decisions Issued 
by International Courts and Other International Bodies on Human Rights in 2003, 3 J. INT’L CRIM.
JUST. 296, 301-302 (2005) (discussing the Shaka Sankofa and Douglas Christopher Thomas cases).  
57
 See Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183 (2005) (holding that execution for a crime committed 
before the age of 18 violates Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment protections).  
58
 See generally John Quigley, U.S. Ratification of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, 22 
ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 401 (2003); Stuart N. Hart, Non-Governmental Efforts Supporting U.S. Rati-
fication of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, 4 LOY. POV. L.J. 141 (1998). 
59
 See Stephen C. Thaman, Is America A Systematic Violator of Human Rights in the Administra-
tion of Criminal Justice? 44 St. LOUIS U. L.J. 999, 1000 n.7 (2000).   
60
 See generally Nkechi Taifa, Codification or Castration?  The Applicability of the International 
Convention to Eliminate All Forms of Racial Discrimination to the U.S. Criminal Justice System, 40 
HOW. L.J. 641 (1997) (applying ICERD standards to U.S. practice); Terry D. Johnson, Unbridled Dis-
cretion and Color Consciousness: Violating International Human Rights in the United States Criminal 
Justice System, 56 RUTGERS L. REV. 231 (2003) (discussing the potential for ICERD to address racial 
discrimination in the criminal justice system).
61
 See generally Alvin J. Bronstein & Jenni Gainsborough, Using International Human Rights 
Laws and Standards for U.S. Prison Reform, 24 PACE L. REV. 811 (2004) (comparing Eighth Amend-
ment jurisprudence with international standards).  
62
 van der Vyver, supra note 40 at 832.  
63
 See Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 128 (Mar. 
31), http://www.icj-cij.org/icjww/idecisions.htm (holding U.S. in violation of the Vienna Convention on 
Consular Relations); see generally Linda E. Carter, Lessons from Avena: The Inadequacy of Clemency 
and Judicial Proceedings for Violations of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, 15 DUKE J.
COMP. & INT’L L. 259 (2005).  
64
 See generally Jaya Ramji, Legislating Away International Law: The Refugee Provisions of the 
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act, 37 STAN. J. INT’L L. 117 (2001) (noting 
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These are but a few examples of the United States’ failure to comply 
with international norms within the realm of civil and political rights, rights 
the U.S. claims are both fundamental and fully protected by the Constitu-
tion.  Another realm of rights recognized under international law—
economic, social and cultural rights—has effectively been banned from 
U.S. discourse.  These are framed in fairly general terms in the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, recognized as embodying customary law; in 
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, which 
the U.S. signed in 1976 but has yet to ratify; and in a number of additional 
treaties such as the Convention on the Rights of the Child and the Conven-
tion on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, neither of which 
the U.S. has ratified.   
Broadly speaking this realm encompasses the right to work; to equal 
pay and protection against systemic unemployment; to formation of trade 
unions; to food, clothing, housing, medical care and education; and to par-
ticipation in cultural, scientific and literary life.65  In what most would view 
as a fundamental violation of such rights, poverty, unemployment and 
homelessness are significant and increasing problems in the U.S.,66 and tens 
of millions of Americans are without access to decent health care or educa-
tion.67  There is nothing in the Constitution which would prevent federal, 
state or local governments from providing a guarantee of minimal income, 
housing, food or medical care and, in fact, a number of states recognize 
such rights under their constitutions.68  Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has 
the Act’s breach of international law pertaining to arbitrary detention, due process, non-refoulement and 
political asylum); David A. Martin, Strategies for a Resistant World: Human Rights Initiatives and the 
Need for Alternatives to Refugee Interdiction, 26 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 753 (1993) (discussing human 
rights problems associated with the policies of interdiction); Arthur C. Helton, The Mandate of U.S. 
Courts to Protect Aliens and Refugees Under International Human Rights Law, 100 YALE L.J. 2335 
(1991) (examining the interdiction of Haitian refugees, detention of Cuban asylum seekers, and the 
judiciary’s use of international law in interpreting U.S. statutes). 
65
 See generally Philip Alston, U.S. Ratification of the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cul-
tural Rights:  The Need for an Entirely New Strategy, 84 AM. J. INT’L L. 365 (1990); Barbara Stark, 
Economic Rights in the United States and International Human Rights Law: Toward an “Entirely New 
Strategy,” 44 HASTINGS L.J. 79 (1992). 
66 In 2001 there were 32.9 million people in the U.S. living in poverty, an increase of 1.3 million 
in one year; unemployment was officially 6% in 2003, and the 2000 census reported 2.3 million people, 
including children, without shelter at least once a year.  Robert Doughten, Filling Everyone’s Bowl: A 
Call to Affirm a Positive Right to Minimum Welfare Guarantees and Shelter in State Constitutions to 
Satisfy International Standards of Human Decency, 39 GONZ. L. REV. 421, 424-25 (2003-2004); see
generally Maria Foscarinis, Homelessness and Human Rights: Towards an Integrated Strategy, 19 ST.
LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 327 (2000).  
67
 See generally Eleanor D. Kinney, The International Human Right to Health:  What Does This 
Mean for Our Nation and World?, 34 IND. L. REV. 1457 (2001); James A. Gross, A Human Rights Per-
spective on U.S. Education: Only Some Children Matter, 50 CATH. U. L. REV. 919 (2001). 
68
 On the potential for using state constitutional protections, see generally Scott T. Jenkins, The 
Influence of International Human Rights Law on State Court and State Constitutions, 90 AM. SOC. INT’L
L. PROC. 259 (1996) (panel discussion); Ann I. Park, Human Rights and Basic Needs: Using Interna-
34
60 FIU Law Review [1:45
not recognized any of these as rights as enforceable under the Constitu-
tion.69
B. Law “Outside” the Constitution?
1. The Plenary Power Doctrine  
In the examples referenced above, the Constitution is acknowledged to 
apply, but has been interpreted in a manner more restrictive than applicable 
international human rights norms.  Thus, even where the Court has found 
no right to welfare or housing, it has engaged in a process of constitutional 
scrutiny, applying its “normal” (Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment) analysis.  
A larger problem from the perspective of human rights jurisprudence is that 
there are a number of areas in which the Supreme Court has simply refused 
to engage in such constitutional analysis, going back at least as far as the 
“plenary power” cases of the late 1800s. 
The U.S. government has consistently refused to extend otherwise ap-
plicable constitutional protections to American Indian nations and “unin-
corporated territories”—i.e., external colonies—such as Puerto Rico.  De-
spite the newly established republic’s explicit recognition of the sovereignty 
of American Indian nations, including its reliance upon treaties with them,70
by the 1830s the Supreme Court had unilaterally declared them “domestic 
dependent nations” whose relationship to the United States was that of a 
“ward” to a “guardian.”71  This was more formally articulated in the 1903 
case of Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, when the Supreme Court made the clearly 
counter factual statement that “[p]lenary authority over the tribal relations 
of the Indians has been exercised by Congress from the beginning, and the 
power has always been deemed a political one, not subject to be controlled 
by the judicial department of the government.”72  On that basis the Court 
upheld the 1887 Allotment Act despite its incompatibility with both the due 
tional Human Rights Norms to Inform Constitutional Interpretation, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1195 (1987); 
Stark, supra note 65; Doughten, supra note 66. 
69
 See, e.g., Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485-86 (1970) (no constitutional right to wel-
fare); Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 74 (1972) (no fundamental right to housing); San Antonio Indep. 
Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973) (no constitutional right to education; disparate financing 
of public education does not trigger strict scrutiny); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 469 (1977) (states have 
no constitutional responsibility for medical expenses of indigents). 
70
 See Wiessner supra note 21 at 591 (noting that the U.S. initially “enter[ed] into treaties of 
friendship and alliance on a perfectly level playing field with . . . Indian nations . . . extending to them 
the same courtesies as to other nations of the then overwhelmingly European international legal order”).   
71
 Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831); see generally Helen W. Winston, 
“An Anomaly Unknown”: Supreme Court Application of International Law Norms on Indigenous Rights 
in the Cherokee Cases (1831-32), 1 TULSA J. COMP. & INT’L L. 339 (1994). 
72
 Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 565 (1903); see generally BLUE CLARK, LONE WOLF V.
HITCHCOCK: TREATY RIGHTS & INDIAN LAW AT THE END OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY (1994). 
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process clause of the Fifth Amendment and the explicit terms of an 1867 
treaty.73
This judicial doctrine of plenary power has consistently been invoked 
to allow Congress and the Executive to engage in otherwise unconstitu-
tional actions against American Indian nations with no semblance of judi-
cial restraint,74 resulting, for example, in generations of American Indian 
children being forced into abusive “boarding schools,”75 and the govern-
ment’s current inability to account for more than one hundred billion dollars 
it confiscated and held “in trust” for individual American Indians.76
Similarly, the United States has, since 1898, exercised jurisdiction over 
“unincorporated territories” without extending the protections of the Consti-
tution to their inhabitants.  From 1898 to 1946 the U.S. considered Filipinos 
“wards” of the United States, “nationals” who owed allegiance to the U.S. 
but were not entitled to the full benefits of citizenship.77  In 1901 Justice 
White declared in Downes v. Bidwell that Puerto Rico “was foreign to the 
United States in a domestic sense,”78 a description that still holds as, after a 
century of U.S. rule, Puerto Ricans have no representation in Congress, 
only qualified citizenship and no right to determine their own political 
status.  To quote Burke Marshall and Christina Duffy Burnett, “[T]he unin-
corporated territories were [and still are] denied even the promise of any 
final status, either within the constitutional framework or outside of it.  
They were [and are] subjected not only to an unequal condition but also to 
absolute uncertainty . . . .”79
With respect to the exercise of U.S. jurisdiction over both American 
Indian nations and external territories, the Supreme Court has thus simply 
announced that it will not hold Congress or the Executive to even minimal 
73
 Saito, Asserting Plenary Power, supra note 26, at 441. 
74
 See generally Nell Jessup Newton, Federal Power over Indians: Its Sources, Scope, and Limi-
tations, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 195 (1984). 
75
 See generally WARD CHURCHILL, KILL THE INDIAN, SAVE THE MAN: THE GENOCIDAL IMPACT 
OF AMERICAN INDIAN RESIDENTIAL SCHOOLS (2004).  
76
 See Cobell v. Norton, 334 F.3d 1128 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (rulings in class action suit filed in 1996 
for unaccounted-for American Indian trust monies); see also Jennifer Talhelm, Inside Washington:  
Cowboy judge in Indian case holds little back, AP Alert, Nov. 28, 2005 (noting the lawsuit claims the 
Interior Department mishandled more than $100 billion in royalties);  Diana Marrero, Tribal members 
place renewed urgency on resolving landmark lawsuit, MUSKOGEE DAILY PHOENIX & TIMES 
DEMOCRAT, Nov. 18, 2005, at 1 (noting charges of governmental “squandering” of $137 billion). 
77
 See Avelino J. Halagao, Jr., Citizens Denied: A Critical Examination of the Rabang Decision 
Rejecting United States Citizenship Claims by Persons Born in the Philippines During the Territorial 
Period, 5 ASIAN PAC. AM. L.J. 77, 77-78 (1998). 
78
 Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 341-42 (1901) (White, J., concurring).  
79
 Christina Duffy Burnett & Burke Marshall, Between the Foreign and the Domestic: The Doc-
trine of Territorial Incorporation, Invented and Reinvented, in FOREIGN IN A DOMESTIC SENSE: PUERTO 
RICO, AMERICAN EXPANSION, AND THE CONSTITUTION 1, 12 (Christina Duffy Burnett & Burke Marshall 
eds., 2001); see generally EFRÉN RIVERA RAMOS, THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF IDENTITY: THE 
JUDICIAL AND SOCIAL LEGACY OF AMERICAN COLONIALISM IN PUERTO RICO (2001). 
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constitutional constraints.  Under these circumstances, for the United States 
to invoke its constitutionalism as an excuse not to comport with interna-
tional law is not only illogical, but amounts to the abandonment of any pre-
tense that the rule of law matters. 
Beginning with the Chinese exclusion cases of the 1880s, the plenary 
power doctrine has been invoked by the Supreme Court in immigration 
matters.  In 1889 Chae Chan Ping, a permanent resident, challenged a stat-
ute which was passed during his absence and prevented his reentry.  The 
Supreme Court acknowledged that the law conflicted with the Burlingame 
Treaty but refused to enforce the treaty, invoking the “last in time” rule,80
and denied Chae Chan Ping’s Fifth Amendment due process claim with the 
assertion that, because of its plenary authority, Congress’ “determination is 
conclusive upon the judiciary.”81  Shortly thereafter, in another Chinese 
exclusion case, the Court extended Congress’ plenary power from exclusion 
to deportation, refusing to characterize deportation as punishment that 
would trigger constitutional scrutiny.82
This rationale was extended during the Cold War to the indefinite de-
tention of those whom the government wished to deport, but had nowhere 
to go.83 The plenary power doctrine continues to be the standard applied.84
In clear violation of international human rights and refugee law, this plenary 
power rationale has been used to allow the indefinite detention of Mariel 
Cubans,85 the interception and forced return of fleeing Haitians found on the 
high seas,86 and the refusal to allow undocumented Chinese laborers and 
80
 Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 600 (1889) (“the last expression of the sover-
eign will must control”).  
81
 Id. at 606. 
82
 Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 730-34 (1893). 
83
 See Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 208 (1953) (allowing a returning 
permanent resident to be held indefinitely on Ellis Island, without a hearing, on the Attorney General’s 
assertion that his entry would be “prejudicial to the public interest”). 
84
 See generally Stephen H. Legomsky, Immigration Law and the Principle of Plenary Congres-
sional Power, 1984 SUP. CT. REV. 255; Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law After a Century of Plenary 
Power: Phantom Constitutional Norms and Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE L.J. 545 (1990); 
ALEINIKOFF, SEMBLANCES OF SOVEREIGNTY, supra note 26.     
85
 See Fernandez-Roque v. Smith, 734 F.2d 576 (11th Cir. 1984); Garcia-Mir v. Meese, 788 F.2d 
1446 (11th Cir. 1986); Richard A. Boswell, Throwing Away the Key: Limits on the Plenary Power?, 18 
MICH. J. INT’L L. 689, 702 (1997) (book review) (noting that Cuban prisoners were not accorded Eighth 
Amendment rights even while held in maximum security federal prisons because immigration detention 
was deemed civil, not criminal); see generally Margaret H. Taylor, Detained Aliens Challenging Condi-
tions of Confinement and the Porous Border of the Plenary Power Doctrine, 22 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q.
1087 (1995). 
86
 See Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155 (1993) (holding that neither the Refu-
gee Convention nor U.S. immigration statutes would be applied to actions on the high seas); see gener-
ally Bill Frelick, Haitian Boat Interdiction and Return: First Asylum and First Principles of Refugee 
Protection, 26 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 675 (1993).   
2006] International Human Rights as U.S. Constitutionalism 63
asylum seekers to land in U.S. ports.87  In 1984 the Eleventh Circuit, relying 
on these cases, held in Jean v. Nelson that Haitian refugees seeking political 
asylum could be incarcerated because noncitizens who have not been ad-
mitted continue to “have no constitutional rights with regard to their appli-
cations, and must be content to accept whatever statutory rights and privi-
leges they are granted by Congress.”88  The following year the Supreme 
Court refused to grant certiorari in Garcia-Mir v. Meese, which followed 
Jean, noting specifically that claims under international human rights law 
were inapplicable to the plight of indefinitely detained Mariel Cubans.89
In sum, the plenary power doctrine under which the Supreme Court 
has refused to apply constitutional constraints to the actions of the “politi-
cal” branches has been applied in immigration law, what is termed “federal 
Indian law,” and the governance of peoples living in territories occupied by 
but not incorporated into the United States.  All told, this means that tens of 
millions of people—both citizens and noncitizens—are subjected to the 
political and military jurisdiction of the United States with no guarantee 
that their basic human rights will be protected except to the extent that the 
United States recognizes and enforces international law.  The Constitution 
is not providing “better” protection to them, because in many aspects of 
their lives it is not even considered applicable. 
2.  Military Necessity—Plenary Power Meets the War on Terror 
In cases in which the government has asserted “military necessity,” the 
Supreme Court has been almost as deferential as it has been in the plenary 
power cases.  Thus, for example, in upholding the internment of nearly 
120,000 Japanese Americans, two-thirds of them U.S. citizens, during 
World War II,90 the Court purported to engage in a constitutional analysis, 
and even announced the “strict scrutiny” standard for race-based classifica-
87
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tions.91  Nonetheless, as summarized in 1945 by Yale Law Professor Eugene 
Rostow, the majority of the justices in each case simply parroted the gov-
ernment’s assertions that “the Japanese [were] a dangerous lot, and that 
there was no time to screen them individually.”92  It followed, as Rostow 
pointed out, that the Court made “no attempt [to require the government] to 
show a reasonable connection between the factual situation and the program 
adopted to deal with it.”93   While the Japanese American internment is 
widely acknowledged to have been a gross violation of fundamental human 
rights, its sanctioning by the Supreme Court still stands as “good” prece-
dent.94
Recent actions by the U.S. government in its “war on terror” illustrate 
that the judiciary is imposing virtually no restraints on violations of interna-
tional law, including both humanitarian and human rights law, on large 
scales or small.  One aspect of what we have seen has been a straightfor-
ward refusal to acknowledge the applicability of well-established tenets of 
international law to U.S. actions.  Thus, we have U.S. government officials 
claiming falsely that the Geneva Conventions do not apply to the war in 
Afghanistan, to certain detainees in Iraq, or to those held at the U.S. naval 
base in Guantánamo Bay, Cuba,95 and attempting to exempt themselves 
generally from customary law, and even jus cogens norms, such as the pro-
hibition on torture.96
More than six hundred men and boys from over forty countries, some 
as young as thirteen, most apparently captured in Afghanistan, have been 
held and interrogated at the U.S. naval base in Guantánamo.  In direct viola-
tion of the Geneva Conventions, the U.S. has maintained, without providing 
evidence, that they are “unlawful combatants” and need not be accorded the 
rights of prisoners of war.97  U.S. officials have engaged in, and officially 
sanctioned, a variety of “interrogation” techniques that clearly violate inter-
91
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national prohibitions on torture.98  Again undermining the argument that 
international norms can be disregarded because the Constitution provides 
adequate protection, constitutional protections are being denied the detain-
ees because, even though they are clearly under U.S. jurisdiction, the 
Guantánamo naval base is “outside” the United States.  In June 2004 the 
Supreme Court did hold that the detainees have a right to have their status 
determined by a “neutral decisionmaker,” but fell far short of extending 
them the full range of constitutional protections.99
“Extraordinary rendition,” or the sending of prisoners to other coun-
tries, presumably for interrogation, has been another way of avoiding com-
pliance with both international and constitutional prohibitions on torture.  
The first civil case challenging this practice is now in court, brought by a 
naturalized Canadian citizen, Maher Arar, who was detained while chang-
ing planes in New York, held in solitary confinement in a Brooklyn jail, 
then sent to Syria and interrogated under torture.  While one would think 
that basic constitutional protections would apply to all persons while held in 
custody within the U.S., government lawyers argued that detaining foreign 
citizens who are merely changing planes in the U.S., holding them without 
charge or access to counsel, and even denying them basic necessities such 
as food is legal.   
The government’s argument, based solidly in immigration cases where 
the Court has deferred to the “plenary power” of Congress and the Execu-
tive, is that under immigration law, anyone presenting a foreign passport, 
even if only changing planes, can be considered to be “seeking admission” 
into the U.S., and that anyone deemed “inadmissible,” even wrongly or 
illegally, remains “outside” the U.S. and therefore outside the protections of 
the Constitution.100  Clearly, if the Constitution were to be interpreted in 
accordance with applicable human rights law, the resort to such legal fic-
tions would not occur. 
In the meantime, at least two U.S. citizens have been detained for sev-
eral years in U.S. military prisons, without charge and, for a long period, 
without access to lawyers, on the government’s assertion that they are “en-
emy combatants.”  Faced with a Supreme Court ruling that Yaser Hamdi 
98
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was entitled to a hearing to contest this designation, the government chose 
instead to deport him to Saudi Arabia, releasing him in return for his relin-
quishment of U.S. citizenship.101  Jose Padilla, continues to be held, pending 
the refiling of his federal lawsuit.102  Padilla is a U.S. citizen, born in Brook-
lyn, arrested at Chicago’s O’Hare Airport and suspected, apparently, of in-
volvement in a plan to use a “dirty bomb.”103  Nothing in this scenario ex-
plains why he should not be prosecuted under applicable criminal laws, 
with attendant constitutional protections.  Again, constitutional protections 
appear to have evaporated, leaving Padilla with nothing comparable to the 
protections he should have under international law.      
These are but a few of many examples illustrating the failure of the 
U.S. government to comply with the most basic requirements of interna-
tional human rights and humanitarian law, and the reluctance of the Su-
preme Court to enforce such rights, either under the Constitution or interna-
tional law.  Coming as they do from many different areas of law, affecting a 
wide range of citizens and noncitizens, and occurring consistently over 
time, they illustrate that such instances cannot be dismissed as mere aberra-
tions, or occasional mistakes, or responses to a national emergency.  In-
stead, they force us, I believe, to acknowledge that U.S. constitutionalism as 
it has been implemented fails to protect the most basic human rights.      
3. The Potential for U.S. Constitutionalism  
In the 1990s we witnessed the emergence of a small number of rogue 
states . . . .   These states: 
Brutalize their own people and squander their national resources for 
the personal gain of the rulers. 
Display no regard for international law, threaten their neighbors, and 
callously violate international treaties to which they are a party. 
Are determined to acquire weapons of mass destruction, along with 
other advanced military technology, to be used as threats or offen-
sively to achieve the aggressive designs of these regimes. 
101
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Sponsor terrorism around the globe. 
Reject basic human values and hate the United States and everything 
for which it stands.
George W. Bush, Introduction to The National Security Strategy 
of the United States 104
The fact that the Supreme Court has construed the first eight amend-
ments to the Constitution in an increasingly restrictive fashion and virtually 
ignored the ninth does not diminish the impact that international human 
right law could, and should, have within the framework of U.S. constitu-
tionalism.  Even within the cramped confines of the “last in time” rule, the 
Court has stated that domestic legislation should be interpreted, where pos-
sible, to conform to U.S. treaty obligations.105  Applying this principle a bit 
more broadly, if the judiciary were to take the incorporation of international 
law into U.S. law seriously, it would be a fairly simple matter legally, if not 
politically, to interpret constitutional rights as at least coextensive with, if 
not more protective than, international human rights law and, more gener-
ally, to integrate international and domestic law.   
If we were to return to first principles, acknowledging the importance 
of U.S. compliance with international law, both because it is a necessary 
component of functioning as a legitimate state and because the framers un-
derstood and incorporated this principle into the Constitution, virtually all 
perceived contradictions between domestic law and international human 
rights could be eliminated and U.S. constitutionalism strengthened.  This 
would require the Supreme Court to take seriously its acknowledged re-
sponsibility to treat the “law of nations” as an integral part of the supreme 
law of the land, as well as its mandate under Article III to ensure that both 
executive action and congressional legislation comport with the Constitu-
tion, without exception.  Such judicial intervention would not be necessary, 
of course, if the “political” branches adhered to their mandate to enact and 
execute legislation and policy which conforms to both the Constitution and 
international law. 
Acknowledgment that international law is an integral part of U.S. law 
would remove domestic incentives for failing to ratify or fully participate in 
international conventions and institutions, eliminate much international 
criticism about the United States for its apparent hypocrisy and, in the proc-
ess, do away with much of the foreign policy-based motivations for attacks 
on the United States and its nationals.  In turn, this would put the U.S. in the 
104
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position of actually being able to strengthen the international human rights 
regime, both with respect to the articulation of law and its effective en-
forcement.   
While this would require a fundamental reorientation of perspective, 
the potential for such change is what makes the Constitution a viable foun-
dation for a truly democratic society.  We have weathered major shifts in 
our understanding of Constitutional reach before, and can do it again.  
While the executive has increasingly distanced itself from international law 
and institutions, at least with respect to humanitarian and human rights 
law—the same certainly cannot be said for international structures of eco-
nomic order106—the judiciary has made tentative moves in the opposite di-
rection.   
Since the Second Circuit’s 1980 decision in Filártiga v. Peña-Irala,
federal courts have allowed civil suits based on egregious violations of cus-
tomary international law to be brought under the Alien Tort Claims Act 
(ATCA).107  As recently as 2004, the Court acknowledged jurisdiction over 
claims involving violations of a norm of “international character accepted 
by the civilized world.”108  As Yale Law School Dean Harold Koh has 
noted, that “[i]n Filartiga, transnational public law litigants finally found 
their Brown v. Board of Education.”109  The ability of foreign nationals to 
bring suits under ATCA led Congress to pass the Torture Victim Protection 
Act, making it easier for U.S. citizens to enforce at least some of these cus-
tomary rights in U.S. courts.110
One criticism of this line of cases has been that they have focused on 
abuses committed outside the United States, reinforcing the notion that hu-
man rights law needs to be enforced “out there.”  However, there has been 
an encouraging recognition of international norms, if not their explicit en-
forcement, in recent Supreme Court cases dealing exclusively with domes-
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tic concerns.  Thus, in holding the execution of mentally retarded persons 
unconstitutional in 2002, Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, ex-
plained that “within the world community, the imposition of the death pen-
alty for crimes committed by mentally retarded offenders is overwhelm-
ingly disapproved.”111  Similarly, in the Supreme Court held in 2005 that the 
execution of persons for crimes committed while under the age of eighteen 
violated the Eight and Fourteenth Amendments.112   The majority noted that 
the “overwhelming weight of international opinion against the juvenile 
death penalty is not controlling here, but provides respected and significant 
confirmation” of its decision.113  In recent university admissions affirmative 
action cases, Justice Ginsburg, joined in one instance by Justice Breyer and 
in another by Justice Souter, referenced the ICERD and “[c]ontemporary 
human rights documents.”114  Striking down Texas sodomy laws, Justice 
Kennedy’s majority opinion cited to holdings of the European Court of 
Human Rights, noting that the right sought “has been accepted as an inte-
gral part of human freedom in many other countries.”115  State courts—as 
well as legislatures—have the ability to directly invoke international law116
and San Francisco recently addressed public sector discrimination by pass-
ing an ordinance based upon the Convention on the Elimination of Dis-
crimination Against Women.117
If these tendencies were expanded and international norms fully incor-
porated into U.S. judicial decisions and governmental action, many of the 
harms referenced above—the denial of basic rights under the rubric of ple-
nary power, the disappearances and arbitrary detentions of immigrants, the 
torture and abuse of detainees, and other violations of the laws of war and 
fundamental human rights—could be avoided.  As currently interpreted and 
implemented, however, U.S. constitutionalism is a very dangerous proposi-
tion.  As many have noted, the hypocrisy embodied in American exception-
alism generates anger and frustration around the world, fueling the very 
111
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forces which are used by the United States as a justification for further vio-
lations of international law, and giving other governments ground for simi-
lar cutbacks in human rights protections.118  Employed in this manner, U.S. 
constitutionalism is caught in a downward spiral eviscerating the human 
rights regime constructed so painfully over the past six decades.   
There is, however, nothing necessary or inevitable about this process.  
The most fundamental principles of U.S. constitutionalism allow, even 
mandate, the incorporation of international law, and the Constitution could, 
with relative ease, be interpreted to encompass protections at least as exten-
sive as those articulated in human rights law.   In the current climate it is, 
notably, the executive and legislative branches of government—those de-
signed to be most accountable to the citizenry—which have moved most 
decisively to constrict human rights.  But this should also give us hope, for 
if this is in fact a democracy, we have the ability to reverse that trend.   
This is the choice we face.  In The Dual State, written in 1940, Ernst 
Fraenkel described the transition in the German government from a norma-
tive state, “endowed with elaborate powers for safeguarding the legal or-
der” to a prerogative state, defined as a “governmental system which exer-
cises unlimited arbitrariness and violence unchecked by any legal guaran-
tees.”119  We can sit back and watch a similar transition, allowing the United 
States to function as a rogue state meeting all of the criteria enumerated 
above by President Bush—aside, perhaps, from the self-insulating assertion 
that such a state, by definition, “hate[s] the United States and everything for 
which it stands.”  We can allow constitutional protections to be treated as 
optional and international law to become Senator Jesse Helms’ “dead cat on 
the doorstep,” trusting, as Justice Brown said in Downes v. Bidwell, that we 
need not worry about despotism for “there are certain principles of natural 
justice inherent in the Anglo-Saxon character which need no expression in 
constitutions or statutes.”120  Or we can seize the opportunity to strengthen 
and revitalize U.S. constitutionalism by returning to the founders’ vision of 
a legal order directly incorporating international law and its evolving pro-
tection of fundamental human rights.   
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